The Federal Coal Leasing Program as an Actionable Subsidy Under International Trade Law by Erpenbach, Jackson
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law 
Volume 9 Issue 2 
2020 
The Federal Coal Leasing Program as an Actionable Subsidy 
Under International Trade Law 
Jackson Erpenbach 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jackson Erpenbach, The Federal Coal Leasing Program as an Actionable Subsidy Under International 
Trade Law, 9 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 503 (2020). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol9/iss2/7 
https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.9.2.federal 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative 
Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
_JCI_EREPENBACH.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2020 1:23 PM 
 
503 
THE FEDERAL COAL LEASING PROGRAM AS 
AN ACTIONABLE SUBSIDY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
Jackson Erpenbach* 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is often criticized for standing in the way of 
responses to climate change. Restrictions on domestic renewable energy subsidies under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) have drawn 
particular disfavor. But critics overlook the role that the SCM Agreement can play in 
similarly disciplining domestic fossil fuel subsidies. This Note demonstrates that potential 
role by focusing on one prominent fossil fuel subsidy in the United States: The Bureau of 
Land Management’s (BLM) coal leasing program on federal lands. The program is an 
actionable subsidy under the SCM Agreement because it provides coal mining rights to 
private companies at artificially low prices. In response, WTO member countries should 
challenge the BLM’s program, either by initiating a dispute at the WTO or by imposing 
countervailing duties on U.S. imports. WTO-authorized retaliation could shift the 
political calculus that keeps the current program in place, meaningfully reducing U.S. 
emissions. 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, May 2020, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Professor 
Donald Regan for inspiring this Note and to Robby Turner and Amber Bennett for their helpful com-
ments. 
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Climate change is “the most systemic threat to humankind.”1 Environmental 
sustainability depends on a rapid transition away from fossil fuels, especially coal.2 
In the United States, roughly forty percent of fossil fuel production takes place on 
federal lands through private leasing agreements administered by the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM).3 The BLM’s leasing program dramatically underprices 
extracted coal, resulting in over-production, lower market prices, and additional 
emissions.4 
The BLM could simply raise leasing prices.5 The current administration, how-
ever, has no appetite to do so.6 This Note instead advocates that U.S. trading part-
ners invoke the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)7 to compel reform of the program. 
The WTO is often criticized for hampering solutions to climate change.8 In 
particular, restrictions on subsidies under the SCM Agreement may narrow a gov-
 
 1. Somini Sengupta, Biggest Threat to Humanity? Climate Change, U.N. Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/climate/united-nations-climate-change.html 
(quoting United Nations secretary general António Guterres); see also Oliver Cann, More Walls, More 
Warming, Less Water: A World at Risk in 2016, WORLD ECON. F. 
 (Jan. 14, 2016), http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2016/press-releases/?doing_wp_cron=
1543884203.7339379787445068359375 (describing climate change as the biggest threat to the global 
economy). 
 2. Coral Davenport, Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html. 
 3. See Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal 
Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (2018); Press Release, The War on Coal is Over: Interi-
or Announces Historic Coal Projects in Utah, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.blm.gov/
press-release/war-coal-over-interior-announces-historic-coal-projects-utah#targetText=
%E2%80%9CCoal%20production%20on%20federal%20lands,percent%20of%20our%20nation’s%20coal. 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. See, e.g., Hein, supra note 3, at 51-54; Michael Burger, A Mitigation-Based Rationale for Incor-
porating a Climate Change Impacts Fee into the Federal Coal Leasing Program, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE L. (Sept. 2016), https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Burger-09-
2016-Climate-Change-Impacts-Fee_1.pdf. 
 6. See, e.g., Devin Henry, Trump Administration Ends Obama’s Coal-Leasing Freeze, HILL (Mar. 
29, 2017), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/326375-interior-department-ends-obamas-
coal-leasing-freeze; Press Release, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, supra note 3. 
 7. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement]. 
 8. See, e.g., Aaditya Mattoo et al., Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy (WORLD BANK, 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 189, 2009), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/
4319; Bradly J. Condon, Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 895 
(2009). 
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ernment’s authority to incentivize renewable energy.9 The SCM Agreement, how-
ever, is double-edged: it can and should be used to discipline subsidies to the fossil 
fuel industry.10 Some scholars have speculated that the SCM Agreement applies to 
fossil fuel subsidies, but they have done so at a relatively high level of generality. 
They have largely concluded that the structure of fossil fuel subsidies avoids disci-
pline under the SCM Agreement.11 This Note focuses its analysis on one promi-
nent fossil fuel subsidy, arguing that the federal coal leasing program amounts to 
an actionable subsidy under the SCM Agreement. 
Part I outlines the BLM’s coal leasing program and argues that it subsidizes 
activities of coal mining companies. Part II applies the SCM Agreement’s rules to 
the BLM program. The artificially low price set for leasing coal mining rights on 
federal land comports with the SCM Agreement’s definition of “subsidy”: a finan-
cial contribution by the government, via the provision of a good, that confers a 
benefit to a specific industry. Finally, Part III speculates as to the remedies availa-
ble to other WTO members to challenge the BLM’s program. Major coal exporters 
could challenge the program through the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (DSU), while major coal importers with their own domestic production could 
impose countervailing duties. 
 
 9. Compare Magnus Lodefalk & Mark Storey, Climate Measures and WTO Rules on Subsidies, 39 
J. WORLD TRADE 23, 31 (2005) (arguing that climate policies are permissible), and Jaemin Lee, SCM 
Agreement Revisited: Climate Change, Renewable Energy, and the SCM Agreement, 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 
613 (2016) (placing renewable energy subsidies under the SCM Agreement’s “general infrastructure” 
exception), with Steve Charnovitz, Green Subsidies and the WTO (EUR. UNIV. INST., Working Paper 
RSCAS 2014/93, 2014) (adopting a more pessimistic position). 
 10. No country has yet initiated a WTO dispute against another member’s fossil fuel subsidy. 
Henok Birhanu Asmelash, Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy Sub-
sidies Are Challenged, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 261, 281 (2015) (“[N]o formal dispute involving fossil fuel 
subsidies has so far been brought to the WTO.”). Fossil fuel subsidies are a major contributor to global 
emissions. Id. at 267. For an overview of global fossil fuel subsidies, see generally David Coady, How 
Large Are Global Fossil Fuel Subsidies?, 91 WORLD DEV. 11 (2017) (calculating the scale of global fossil 
fuel subsidies). 
 11. See, e.g., Asmelash, supra note 10; Chris Wold et al., Leveraging Climate Change Benefits 
Through the World Trade Organization: Are Fossil Fuel Subsidies Actionable?, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 635 
(2012); Robert Howse, Securing Policy Space for Clean Energy under the SCM Agreement: Alternative Ap-
proaches, INT’L CTR FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Dec. 2013), https://www.ictsd.org/sites/
default/files/research/E15_CleanEnergy_Howse_FINAL.pdf. Often, scholars focus on the legality of 
green energy subsidies under the SCM Agreement after only a cursory observation that fossil fuel sub-
sidies cannot be challenged. See, e.g., Sherzod Shadikhodjaev, Renewable Energy and Government Support: 
Time to ‘Green’ the SCM Agreement?, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 479, 483 (2015) (“It is arguably not easy 
to apply the SCM disciplines to successfully block fossil fuel subsidies.”). 
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I.  THE BLM’S COAL LEASING PROGRAM 
A.  Structure of the Program 
The BLM manages roughly 570 million acres of federal land that can be leased 
to private companies for mining coal.12 Just over forty percent of all coal in the 
United States is extracted from BLM leases.13 Eighty-five percent of that federal 
coal is produced solely in the Powder River Basin (PRB) region of Wyoming and 
Montana.14 
Under the Mineral Leasing Act, the BLM conducts lease sales at “fair market 
value,” administers the leases, and monitors production to calculate the royalties 
owed by mining companies.15 A mining company compensates the federal govern-
ment for the right to extract coal in two primary steps.16 First, a company purchas-
es a lease, either through application or a competitive bidding process, based on the 
fair market value of the underlying coal deposits.17 Calculation of fair market value 
is a flexible process guided by prior sales, expected production, and resulting in-
come.18 Second, the mining company must pay a fixed percentage of the value of 
the extracted coal in the form of royalties.19 
 
 12. Coal, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
 13. Eric Lipton & Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trump-coal-mining-gets-
new-life-on-us-lands.html. This percentage represents a dramatic increase since 1960, when only 1.3 
percent of coal was produced on federal lands. See Hein, supra note 3, at 9. 
 14. Background, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/
coal/background (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Coal companies must also pay rent on leased land, Lease Management, BUREAU LAND 
MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal/lease-management (last visited Dec. 
5, 2018), but rent amounts are negligible. Kenneth Gillingham et al., Reforming the U.S. Coal Leasing 
Program: Royalty Rates and Auction Practices do not Reflect the Social Costs of Coal, 354 SCIENCE 1096, 1097 
(2016). 
 17. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (2012); Lease by Application (LBA) Process, BUREAU LAND 
MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal/lease-by-application-process (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2018). In brief, under competitive bidding, the BLM selects a tract of land and the right 
to mine it goes to the company that bid the highest. In the application process, a mining company itself 
selects a tract of land that it would like to mine and submits a proposal to BLM to lease it. BUREAU 
LAND MGMT., Frequently Asked Questions About the Federal Coal Leasing Program, 6-8, 
https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/nepa/64842/78268/88489/CoalFAQ.pdf (last visit-
ed Jan. 19, 2020). 
 18. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD 
ENHANCE APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE 
MORE PUBLIC INFORMATION 33 (2013) (criticizing the BLM’s approach for being inconsistent and for 
regularly establishing low fair market values). 
 19. See Lease by Application (LBA) Process, supra note 17. These royalties are a significant source 
of revenue for the federal and state governments. See Hein, supra note 3, at 8, 11. 
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This program has been criticized for systematically underpricing federal coal 
resources at both the leasing and royalty stages. 
B.  Deficiencies of the Program 
The BLM’s coal leasing program amounts to a subsidy to coal mining compa-
nies because it underprices the value of federal mining leases. Four features of the 
program result in inadequate leasing and royalty rates: the fair market value fails to 
reflect the value of the underlying resources, the uncompetitive bidding process 
depresses lease prices, companies circumvent royalties through captive transfers, 
and finally, the entire program fails to account for negative externalities of coal 
production. 
1.  Pricing Below Fair Market Value 
The simplest cause of underpricing is that the fair market value used to ap-
praise mining leases fails to reflect the actual value of the resources. First, BLM’s 
calculation of the value of its leases fails to incorporate the potential for coal ex-
ports.20 Because coal exports command significantly higher prices than domestic 
sales, the fair market value “systematically underprice[s] coal owned by the Ameri-
can public, potentially leading to millions of dollars in foregone revenue each 
year.”21 Independent reports by the GAO and even the Department of the Interi-
or’s own Office of the Inspector General highlighted this deficiency.22 Second, 
BLM’s pricing for mining leases ignores the opportunity cost of leasing the land 
out for cattle grazing.23 This similarly results in undervaluation, as low-priced leas-
es push ranchers off grazing land.24 
 
 20. See CLARK WILLIAMS-DERRY, SIGHTLINE INST., UNFAIR MARKET VALUE: BY IGNORING 
EXPORTS, BLM UNDERPRICES FEDERAL COAL 1-2, 13 (July 2014), https://www.sightline.org/
research_item/unfair-market-value/. 
 21. Id. at 1; see also Hein, supra note 3, at 15. 
 22. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 36-39; OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CR-EV-BLM-0001-2012, COAL MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 6-9 (2013), https://www.doioig.gov/sites/
doioig.gov/files/CR-EV-BLM-0001-2012Public.pdf (“BLM does not fully account for export potential 
in developing the [fair market value]s.”). The BLM’s calculation of fair market value nominally 
acknowledges the role of exports, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., H-3070-1, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF 
COAL PROPERTIES 3-8 (2014), but independent studies by the GAO, DOI Office of Inspector General, 
and nongovernmental groups have concluded that insufficient attention is paid to exports in practice. 
 23. See Neela Banerjee & Robert McClure, How Federal Giveaways to Big Coal Leave Ranchers 
and Taxpayers Out in the Cold, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 29, 2017), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/29122017/wyoming-powder-river-basin-coal-subsidies-climate-change-oil-gas-trump; cf. Terry 
Punt & Leland James Turner, Guest Opinion: BLM Fails to Change With Coal Market, BILLINGS 
GAZETTE (May 4, 2018), https://billingsgazette.com/opinion/columnists/guest-opinion-blm-fails-to-
change-with-coal-market/article_9cf0c082-1c07-507f-b2d3-cc795357e70e.html. 
 24. See Banerjee & McClure, supra note 23. 
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2.  Uncompetitive Bidding 
The Mineral Leasing Act requires that coal leases be offered to private miners 
on the basis of competitive bidding.25 Unfortunately, for several structural reasons, 
the BLM has fallen short of this ideal. These reasons—which benefit established 
companies—include the fact that leases tend to be small and directly adjacent to 
active mines as well as the significant capital investments required to develop a 
new mining site.26 Lack of competition is particularly a concern in the PRB be-
cause, despite its enormous coal production, it was decertified as a coal-producing 
region in 1990 following pressure from the coal mining industry.27 This means that 
leasing procedures in the PRB are more lenient than in other regions and land to 
be leased is identified by mining companies in applications, producing less compet-
itive prices.28 A GAO study reflects this reality, finding that only ten percent of 
federal coal leases had more than one bidder.29 This lack of bidding competition 
results in an artificially low fair market value set by the BLM.30 A low winning bid 
for one lease provides a benchmark that BLM uses to calculate lower values for fu-
ture leases.31 
3.  Inadequate Royalties 
After a company has secured a mining lease, it pays a royalty calculated as a 
fixed percentage of the value of the coal sold in its first transaction.32 In practice, 
royalty rates fall below the rate that would be set by market competition. First, the 
royalties are simply too low: they have not increased since the Mineral Leasing Act 
was passed in 1920, and are lower than rates set by many state and foreign gov-
ernments.33 Second, assessing the royalty value at the first sale allows companies to 
 
 25. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012). 
 26. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 17-18; Hein, supra note 3, at 
13; Gillingham et al., supra note 16, at 1097 (“[B]idding is often uneconomic for other firms, leaving the 
operator of the existing mine without meaningful competition.”). 
 27. Josh Lappen, A Policy History of Federal Coal Leasing: Past and Present Challenges, 19 WYO. L. 
REV. 151, 165 (2019) (noting the shift from the BLM-led management of certified regions to industry-
led selection of land in newly-decertified regions). 
 28. Id.; see also JEREMY NICHOLS, WILDEARTH GUARDIANS, THE POWDER RIVER BASIN OF 
THE WEST: KEY TO SOLVING GLOBAL WARMING 17-19 (Nov. 23, 2009), 
https://pdf.wildearthguardians.org/site/DocServer/report_powder_river_11-23-09.pdf. 
 29. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 15-16. 
 30. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 22, at 7. (“Comparable sales are a key 
component of determining the [fair market value]. In two recent sales . . . , however, BLM developed 
its comparable sales analyses using a lower bid amount . . . . [T]he risk of accepting a lower bid is in-
creased with an inappropriately low [fair market value].”); Hein, supra note 3, at 14 (observing that 
“bids have failed to even keep up with inflation”); NICHOLS, supra note 28, at 19. 
 31. Lappen, supra note 27, at 172-73. 
 32. See Lease by Application (LBA) Process, supra note 17. 
 33. See Hein, supra note 3, at 14, 18. 
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circumvent paying based on the true market value of the coal.34 Companies often 
sell coal to an affiliate at an artificially low price (termed “captive transactions”) in 
order to pay a lower royalty. The affiliate then sells at the higher market rate.35 
Finally, the BLM allows companies to invoke deductions for cleaning and trans-
portation of extracted coal, among other things, to set a lower price.36 
As a result of these three shortcomings, there is a significant and growing gap 
between the price of federally owned coal and that of coal mined on private land.37 
The low price of federal coal “clearly exerts a strong downward pressure on the na-
tional average coal price.”38 
4.  Failure to Capture Externalities 
The BLM’s pricing for coal also excludes significant negative externalities. 
Most directly, coal extraction produces significant pollution at the mining site.39 In 
the long term, state and federal governments may bear these costs because many 
 
 34. See Matt Lee-Ashley & Nidhi Thakar, Cutting Subsidies and Closing Loopholes in the U.S. De-
partment of the Interior’s Coal Program, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 6, 2015), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2015/01/06/103880/cutting-subsidies-and-
closing-loopholes-in-the-u-s-department-of-the-interiors-coal-program/. 
 35. See id.; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE ECONOMICS OF COAL LEASING 
ON FEDERAL LANDS: ENSURING A FAIR RETURN TO TAXPAYERS 17 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160622_cea_coal_leasing.pdf 
(“Federal PRB coal tends to be sold at low prices to subsidiaries . . . then sold for higher prices in a final 
transaction. This vertically-integrated arrangement . . . provides a perverse incentive . . . .”); Patrick 
Rucker, Asia Coal Export Boom Brings no Bonus for U.S. Taxpayers, REUTERS (Dec. 4, 2012), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-coal-royalty/asia-coal-export-boom-brings-no-bonus-for-u-s-
taxpayers-idUSBRE8B30IL20121204 (calculating that this loophole was used to avoid paying $40 mil-
lion in royalties in 2011 alone). 
 36. See Hein, supra note 3, at 21-22; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 35, 
at 8, 18. 
 37. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 35, at 16 (“[The] gap between Federal 
PRB coal and private coal prices has widened, with private coal from Appalachian and interior States 
ranging from $30 per ton to as high as $100 per ton . . . while Federal PRB coal still remains close to 
$10 per ton.”). 
 38. Id. at 17 (“EIA forecasts suggest that this trend will continue, further increasing the influ-
ence of Federal coal in setting lower market prices for coal in the United States . . . .”); see also Alison 
Cassady, Complex Market Forces Are Challenging Appalachian Coal Mining, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2014/10/06/98371/complex-
market-forces-are-challenging-appalachian-coal-mining/ (linking low prices of PRB coal to downward 
price pressures that harm higher-priced coal production regions). Spot prices for PRB coal offer addi-
tional, though incomplete, evidence of this pricing pressure. The price of PRB coal is typically half the 
price of any other region and only a quarter of the price of Appalachian coal. Coal Markets, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/coal/markets/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). 
 39. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 28, at 8-10 (describing environmental disruption caused by 
strip-mining techniques in the PRB); Gary Braasch, Powder River Basin Coal on the Move, SCI. AM. 
(Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/powder-rive-basin-coal-on-the-move/ (cata-
loguing air, water, and noise pollution as well as irreparable destruction of habitat). 
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coal companies simply cannot afford remediation.40 The harm resulting from the 
effects of climate change presents an even larger externality.41 Burning federal coal 
accounts for ten percent of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.42 
As a matter of public policy, the BLM should raise its pricing to better inter-
nalize these externalities.43 Because private coal leases also exclude such externali-
ties, however, they are not a basis for identifying an actionable government subsi-
dy.44 Part II outlines the SCM Agreement and argues that BLM’s leasing program 
satisfies the criteria for an actionable subsidy. 
II.  APPLYING THE SCM AGREEMENT 
The WTO disciplines domestic subsidies through the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Article VI45 and the SCM Agreement.46 These agree-
ments define an actionable subsidy as having the following three elements. 
First, “a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if . . . there is a financial contribution 
by a government or any public body . . . and . . . a benefit is thereby conferred.”47 
SCM Article 1.1 then lists four types of financial contributions: “a direct transfer 
 
 40. See Mark Olalde, US Coal Hasn’t Set Aside Enough Money to Clean Up Its Mines, 
DESMOGBLOG (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.desmogblog.com/2018/03/16/us-coal-hasnt-set-aside-
enough-money-clean-its-mines; Scott Fields, The Earth’s Open Wounds: Abandoned and Orphaned Mines, 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., Mar. 2003, at 154, 161 (observing that “the role of addressing cleanup invari-
ably falls to governmental agencies, generally to the federal land management agencies”). 
 41. See Gillingham et al., supra note 16, at 1097 (“[T]he monetized climate damages from PRB 
coal combustion are about six times the spot price of coal. This underscores that PRB coal is substantial-
ly underpriced relative to its social costs.”); Hein, supra note 3, at 21 (“Failure to account for the exter-
nality costs of fossil fuel production . . . means that the public bears the burden of mitigating and adapt-
ing to such costs, including greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”). 
 42. Hein, supra note 3, at 22. 
 43. See id. at 18, 51-54 (advocating that BLM’s “royalty rate can be used as type of Pigouvian 
tax” to account for environmental externalities). 
 44. See infra Section II.B. “Some fossil fuel subsidy estimates  . . . comprise failure to price neg-
ative externalities associated with the consumption of fossil fuels. But such regulatory support measures 
do not fall within the list of financial contributions, and hence fall outside the ambit of the SCM 
Agreement.” Asmelash, supra note 10, at 271. 
 45. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 46. The SCM Agreement added to GATT Art. VI’s limitations on domestic subsidies. It out-
right forbids “prohibited” subsidies and makes otherwise “actionable” subsidies subject to challenge 
through the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding or by authorizing countervailing duties on im-
ported, subsidized goods. Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Overview, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
 47. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1.1 (emphasis added). 
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of funds,” foregoing revenue that is otherwise due, provision of “goods or services 
other than general infrastructure,” and purchase of goods.48 
Second, a subsidy must be specific.49 A subsidy is de jure specific if it “explic-
itly limits access to certain enterprises,” or if it is “limited to . . . a designated geo-
graphical region.”50 Alternatively, a subsidy is de facto specific based on its 
“use . . . by a limited number of certain enterprises,” whether it is granted “dispro-
portionately . . . to certain enterprises,” and “the manner in which discretion has 
been exercised.”51 
Third, another WTO member may seek a remedy only if the subsidy causes 
an “adverse effect” to the interests of that country.52 The country may then chal-
lenge the subsidy through the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)53 or im-
pose countervailing duties on subsidized imports.54 
This section argues that BLM’s program is an actionable subsidy under the 
SCM Agreement.55 Specifically, the program is a financial contribution by the 
U.S. government which, through provision of a good, confers a benefit to a specific 
industry. Part III develops support for the last requirement of an actionable subsi-
dy: it has adverse effects on other WTO members.56 
A.  Financial Contribution via Provision of a Good 
Under SCM Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii), “a financial contribution” includes when “a 
government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure.”57 The 
 
 48. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) prevents circumvention of these 
requirements by specifying that the government may not simply have a “private body . . . carry out one 
or more of the type of functions illustrated . . . above.” Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv). 
 49. Id. art. 2. 
 50. Id. art. 2.1(a), 2.2. 
 51. Id. art. 2.1(c). 
 52. Id. art. 5. 
 53. Id. art. 7; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 54. GATT, supra note 45, at art. VI:3. 
 55. One could also argue that the leasing program is a prohibited subsidy under the theory that it 
is, “contingent . . . in fact,” an export subsidy. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 3.1(a). One critic 
argues that BLM’s program actually favors the export of coal over domestic sales. See Williams-Derry, 
supra note 20, at 1. If true, then BLM’s subsidy may increase the ratio of export sales to domestic sales, 
fulfilling the AB’s test for export subsidies. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Cer-
tain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶¶ 1046-49, WTO Doc. WT/
DS316/AB/R (adopted May 18, 2011) [hereinafter EC—Aircraft]. Prohibited subsidies are subject to 
stricter procedures for securing a remedy through the DSU. See SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 
4. However, fossil fuel subsidies are most likely to be challenged as actionable subsidies. See Asmelash, 
supra note 10, at 274. 
 56. See infra Part III. 
 57. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii). 
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Appellate Body (AB), which hears appeals from disputes between WTO members, 
has interpreted both terms at issue here: “provides” and “goods.”58 The coal leasing 
program provides a good, coal, within the AB’s articulation of Article 1.1. 
1.  A Right to Extract a Resource is a Good 
The AB has interpreted the term “good” in the context of natural resources in 
two prominent reports: United States—Softwood Lumber IV59 and United States—
Carbon Steel (India).60 In Softwood Lumber IV, the AB considered a challenge by 
Canada against U.S. countervailing duties imposed on softwood lumber imports.61 
The United States determined that Canada’s stumpage program provided the lum-
ber industry standing timber at less than adequate remuneration.62 Under Canada’s 
program, private companies entered into licensing agreements with provincial gov-
ernments to harvest timber from public land if they met certain maintenance obli-
gations and paid a “volumetric ‘stumpage charge’” for the harvested timber.63 
Though the AB faulted the imposition of U.S. duties for other reasons,64 it con-
cluded that Canada’s program constituted a provision of a “good,” standing tim-
ber.65 
In reaching this conclusion, the AB began by defining “goods” generally—as 
“tangible or movable personal property other than money,” including “things to be 
severed from real property.”66 The AB then made several interpretive moves that 
 
 58. “The Appellate Body was established in 1995 under Article 17 of the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). It is a standing body of seven per-
sons that hears appeals from reports issued by panels in disputes brought by WTO Members. The Ap-
pellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a panel, and Appellate 
Body Reports, once adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), must be accepted by the parties to 
the dispute.” Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2019). 
 59. Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to 
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter Lumber IV (AB)]. 
 60. Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from India, WTO Doc. WT/DS436/AB/R (adopted Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Carbon 
Steel (AB)]. 
 61. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 1. 
 62. Id. ¶ 2. 
 63. Panel Report, United States—Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lum-
ber from Canada, ¶ 7.14, WTO Doc. WT/DS236/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Lumber III 
(Panel)]. 
 64. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶¶ 108-22, 165-66, 168. 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 67, 76. 
 66. Id. ¶ 58. 
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established a broad meaning of “goods.”67 For one, the French and Spanish ver-
sions of the SCM Agreement support an inclusive meaning of the term, as distinct 
from merely “products.”68 Further, alluding to the logic of expressio unius, the AB 
observed that Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) lists only one exception, “general infrastruc-
ture.”69 It inferred, then, that “all goods that might be used by an enterprise to its 
benefit”—aside from “infrastructure of a general nature”—are goods under the 
SCM.70 The AB also supplemented its textual analysis with pragmatic considera-
tions, finding that a broad definition of “goods” furthers the purpose of preventing 
circumvention of the WTO’s subsidy rules “in cases of financial contributions 
granted in a form other than money.”71 
This definition of “goods” comfortably includes the coal underlying American 
public land as it does the standing timber on Canadian public land. Like standing 
timber, coal is tangible, capable of possession, and “severable from land.”72 Fur-
ther, coal also satisfies Canada’s proposed requirement that a good be tradable.73 
The 2014 Carbon Steel (India) report confirms this conclusion. In that dispute, 
India challenged U.S. countervailing duties on Indian steel exports because of al-
leged government provision of iron and coal mining rights.74 Again, the AB criti-
cized several portions of the U.S. investigation,75 but concluded that the mining 
rights constituted a provision of goods to the Indian steel industry.76 This conclu-
sion drew heavily from the above analysis in Softwood Lumber IV.77 Without much 
 
 67. The AB utilized Articles 33 and 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
referring to other language versions, context, and purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
arts. 31(1), 33(1), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 68. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 59; see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization art. XVI(6), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 (establishing English, French, and Spanish as the 
three “authentic” languages of the WTO); see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶ 60, WTO Doc. WT/DS184/AB/R (adopted 
July 24, 2001) (defining “a permissible interpretation [as] one which is found to be appropriate after 
application of the pertinent rules of the Vienna Convention” (emphasis in original)). 
 69. Id. ¶ 60. 
 70. Id.; see also Lumber III (Panel), supra note 63, ¶ 7.26 (observing that “the SCM Agreement 
does not in any way provide a [correlating] exception for the right to exploit natural resources”). The 
AB rejected Canada’s proposed definitions of goods as necessarily “traded” goods capable of tariff classi-
fication, Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 62; “personal property,” id. ¶ 65; or requiring specification 
of individual items, such as particular trees to be harvested, id. 
 71. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 65. 
 72. Id. ¶ 59; see also Asmelash, supra note 10, at 270 (“There is no question over the fact that 
energy products such as oil, liquefied natural gas, and solid fuels are goods.”). 
 73. See, e.g., U.S. Coal Exports Increased by 61% in 2017 as Exports to Asia More than Doubled, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=35852. 
 74. Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶¶ 1.1-1.2. 
 75. Id. ¶¶ 4.55, 4.353, 5.1-5.2. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 4.73-4.75. 
 77. Id. ¶¶ 4.67-4.69. 
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equivocation, the AB concluded that coal satisfied its previously-articulated defini-
tion of a good.78 
2.  A Right to Extract is a Provision of Coal 
Softwood Lumber IV and Carbon Steel (India) also clarify that a governmental 
grant of a right to extract natural resources fits the meaning of providing a good in 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii).79 
In Softwood Lumber IV, the AB defined “provide” as “to supply or furnish for 
use,” or “to put at the disposal of.”80 It rejected a narrow definition of “provide” 
merely to “supply.”81 The AB recognized, however, that not every government ac-
tion which makes goods available to an enterprise is necessarily a provision of such 
goods.82 Instead, there must be a “reasonably proximate relationship” between the 
“action of the government” and the “use or enjoyment of the good . . . by the re-
cipient.”83 This test is explicitly outcome-based, looking at “the consequence of the 
transaction.”84 
Canada’s stumpage arrangement satisfied this proximate relationship. As the 
AB stated, the “stumpage arrangements g[a]ve tenure holders a right to enter . . . 
government lands, cut standing timber, and enjoy exclusive rights over the timber 
that is harvested.”85 Though the government does “not supply the felled trees” 
themselves, the “[r]ights over felled trees . . . crystallize as a natural and inevitable 
consequence of . . . harvesting rights.”86 The program’s “raison d’être” was “making 
available timber” to harvesters.87 
Carbon Steel (India) built upon the reasonably proximate relationship test by 
applying it to India’s provision of mining rights to steel companies.88 The AB dis-
missed India’s argument that the relationship was too remote because of the com-
plex intermediate steps required to extract and refine coal and iron ore.89 Ultimate-
ly, like in Softwood Lumber IV, mining rights “put iron ore and coal deposits at the 
disposal of steel companies” and provided them “exclusive[ ] . . . use of those re-
 
 78. Id. ¶ 4.70, 4.72 (referring to “the final goods consisting of extracted iron ore and coal” and 
“final extracted goods”). The definition of “good” is rarely the focus of an AB adjudicated dispute aris-
ing under the SCM. Of the few where it is, none, support a finding that coal is not a good. 
 79. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv). 
 80. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 69. 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 71-73. 
 82. Id. ¶ 71. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. ¶ 75. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶ 4.70. 
 89. Id. ¶¶ 4.70-4.75. 
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sources.”90 Steel companies acquired mining rights knowing that rights over the 
underlying resource “[were] a natural and inevitable consequence[,] . . . sug-
gest[ing] that making available . . . coal is the raison d’être” of the arrangement.91 
Both the AB and Panel below contrasted rights to extract, which have a close rela-
tionship to the ultimate good, with mere rights to explore, where the relationship is 
“more tenuous.”92 
The analogy to the BLM’s leasing program is straightforward.93 A lease is a 
right to extract that puts the coal underlying a discrete portion of American public 
land at the disposal of a mining company.94 Like Carbon Steel (India), the relation-
ship between the act of leasing and the final good, coal, is sufficiently proximate. 
The BLM leases grant rights “expressly to enable the beneficiary to extract for its 
use . . . what was previously a government controlled mineral, in this case, . . . 
coal.”95 
B.  Conferring a Benefit 
Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement requires that, as a result of the govern-
ment provision of the good, “a benefit is thereby conferred” to the recipient.96 The 
AB provided an authoritative interpretation of “benefit” in Canada—Aircraft.97 In 
that report, the AB observed that benefit’s “ordinary meaning . . . clearly encom-
passes some form of advantage.”98 It further stated that “a ‘benefit’ does not exist 
in the abstract” but requires that a recipient has “received and enjoyed . . . some-
thing.”99 Analysis of the benefit, then, is focused on the “benefit to the recipient,” 
not the “cost to the government.”100 This distinction is important for analyzing the 
 
 90. Id. ¶ 4.74. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. India’s challenged leasing program granted “captive” mining rights that only permitted ex-
tracted minerals to be used by the owner company. Steel Companies May Be Permitted to Divert Ore from 
Captive Mines to Other Units, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
industry/indl-goods/svs/steel/steel-companies-may-be-permitted-to-divert-ore-from-captive-mines-to-
other-units/articleshow/71782750.cms. Since the WTO dispute, India has announced reforms to make 
the market more competitive. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he coal so offered for lease shall be for use by 
such entity or entities in implementing a definite plan to produce energy for their own use or for sale to 
their members or customers . . . .”). 
 95. Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶ 4.75. 
 96. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1.1(b). 
 97. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada—Aircraft]. 
 98. Id. ¶ 153. 
 99. Id. ¶ 154. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 155-56. 
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BLM’s program because leasing federal land is not a cost to government but actual-
ly a significant source of federal revenue.101 
1.  Identification of Benefit 
Crucially, the term “benefit” also requires a comparison.102 An entity receives 
a benefit if it is made “‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been, absent that 
[financial] contribution.”103 The AB further stated that “the marketplace provides 
an appropriate basis for comparison in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been 
‘conferred.’”104 A financial contribution confers a benefit if the terms offered to the 
recipient are more favorable than those offered by the market.105 The text of Arti-
cle 14 refers to “the market” and “prevailing market conditions” to calculate various 
types of subsidies, confirming that the marketplace is a “basis for comparison.”106 
Article 14(d) was central in the Softwood Lumber IV and Carbon Steel (India) re-
ports. It states: 
[T]he provision of goods or services . . . by a government shall not be 
considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less 
than adequate remuneration . . . . The adequacy of remuneration shall be 
determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service 
in question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, qual-
ity, availability, marketability, transportation and other condi-
tions . . . .).107 
This language “link[s] the concepts of ‘benefit’ and ‘remuneration’ such 
that . . . a showing that ‘remuneration’ is ‘less than adequate’ is consonant with a 
finding of ‘benefit.’”108 Most simply, the benefit conferred is equal to the differ-
ence between the government price and the benchmark price, the benchmark being 
the prevailing market price in the country of provision.109 In Softwood Lumber IV, 
however, the AB addressed the U.S. investigation of Canada’s stumpage arrange-
ment, which used a proxy price as a benchmark rather than private prices in Cana-
da’s market.110 The United States argued that the government’s predominance in 
 
 101. See Hein, supra note 3, at 8, 11. 
 102. Canada—Aircraft, supra note 97, ¶ 157. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. ¶ 157. 
 106. Id. ¶ 158; SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at arts. 14(b)-(d). 
 107. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, art. 14(d) (emphasis added). 
 108. Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶¶ 4.125-4.126 (“Article 14(d) . . . establishes the adequa-
cy of remuneration as the lens through which ‘benefit’ . . . must be assessed.”). 
 109. Id. ¶¶ 4.148-4.149 (“Prevailing market conditions in the country of provision is thus the 
standard for assessing the adequacy of remuneration.”). 
 110. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 80. 
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the standing timber market distorted private prices, making the market an inaccu-
rate benchmark.111 Instead, the United States utilized a proxy price based on 
stumpage rates in U.S. border states adjusted for conditions in Canada.112 The 
Panel concluded that this approach was inconsistent with Article 14(d)’s compari-
son to prevailing market conditions in Canada.113 
While the AB rejected the U.S. proxy here, it nevertheless interpreted Article 
14(d)’s “in relation to prevailing market conditions” language more broadly to 
permit use of other benchmark prices in exceptional circumstances.114 Use of pre-
vailing market prices is the default “starting-point” on the assumption that private 
prices “generally represent an appropriate measure of the ‘adequacy of remunera-
tion’ for the provision of goods.”115 But when that assumption breaks down, inves-
tigating governments may use alternative benchmarks to account for government-
caused distortions.116 Otherwise, the resulting calculation of the benefit would be 
inaccurate, frustrating the purposes of both Article 14 and the SCM Agreement 
more broadly by rewarding WTO members for circumventing their commit-
ments.117 
Specifically, an investigating country “may use a benchmark other than private 
prices . . . in the country of provision[ ] when it has been established that these 
private prices are distorted[ ] because of the dominant role of the government in 
the market.”118 Government participation, when sufficiently predominant, causes 
private suppliers to “align their prices with those of the government” such that it is 
not “possible to calculate benefit.”119 The AB emphasized that this is a “very lim-
ited” exception.120 Merely “alleg[ing] that a government is a significant supplier 
would not, on its own, prove distortion and allow” a different benchmark.121 
A proper benchmark aside from the private market could include proxies for 
the cost of production and profits as well as “prices for similar goods quoted on 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 7.64, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter 
Lumber IV (Panel)]; see also Lumber III (Panel), supra note 63, ¶ 7.53 (“[T]he text of Article 14 SCM 
Agreement leaves no choice to the investigating authority but to use as a benchmark the market . . . as it 
exists in the country of provision.”). 
 114. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 88; see also id. ¶ 91 (stating use of “any” method in the 
chapeau of Article 14 similarly suggests that calculation of benefit can be flexible). 
 115. Id. ¶ 90. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. ¶¶ 93-96. 
 118. Id. ¶ 103. 
 119. Id. ¶ 101. 
 120. Id. ¶ 102. 
 121. Id. 
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world markets.”122 Above all, a benchmark must always “connect[ ] with[ ] prevail-
ing market conditions in the country of provision.”123 Otherwise, the AB is cau-
tious of both utilizing prices from other countries124 and evaluating any price 
methodology in the abstract.125 Ultimately, the AB concluded there to be insuffi-
cient factual evidence either to measure the extent of government-induced price 
distortion in Canada or to identify an accurate alternative benchmark.126 
Subsequent reports built on Softwood Lumber IV. First, there is no “per se rule” 
for using out-of-country prices whenever “the government is the predominant 
supplier.”127 Instead, panels should consider the presence of price distortions on a 
“case-by-case basis,” keeping in mind that “the more predominant a government’s 
role[,] . . . the more likely this role will result in . . . distortion.”128 Second, investi-
gating governments may resort to benchmarks outside the private market for rea-
sons other than government-induced distortion.129 Though the bar remains high, 
“there may be other circumstances where an investigating authority would not be 
required to use in-country prices.”130 
2.  Calculation of Benefit 
Here, a WTO member challenging the BLM’s leasing program could calculate 
the size of the benefit conferred by reference to one of two prices: either prevailing 
coal prices in the U.S. market or a proxy price calculated with reference to, for ex-
ample, international coal prices, costs of production and transportation, and ex-
pected profits. Either approach is tenable here. 
First, the price of federal coal extracted from BLM leases is far below that of 
coal extracted from private lands.131 In 1990, private coal on average cost 3.3 times 
as much as federal coal, while the price in 2014 was a full 5 times higher.132 Though 
a portion of this price difference is attributable to chemical differences of the coal 
 
 122. Id. ¶ 106. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. ¶ 108; see also Lumber III (Panel), supra note 63, ¶ 7.58 (“[D]omestic markets of the 
member countries of the WTO are not identical—nor are they expected to be . . . .”). 
 125. See Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶ 106 (“We, therefore, make no findings on the WTO-
consistency of any of these methods in the abstract.”). 
 126. Id. ¶¶ 115-18. 
 127. Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, ¶ 443, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter 
US—Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)]. 
 128. Id. ¶¶ 444, 446 (emphasis in original); see also Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶ 4.156. 
 129. Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶¶ 4.186-4.188. 
 130. Id. ¶¶ 4.189-4.191. 
 131. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 35, at 16. 
 132. Id. 
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that underlies federal and private lands, a large portion is a result of BLM’s subsi-
dization.133 
Second, the BLM may be such a predominant supplier of coal that private 
suppliers are forced to lower their own prices, distorting the market.134 A panel 
would determine whether the degree of distortion is sufficiently exceptional to jus-
tify departing from the strong presumption of using private market prices. For 
comparison, the BLM supplies roughly forty percent of U.S. coal,135 while in Soft-
wood Lumber IV, Canada’s stumpage arrangement supplied seventy to ninety per-
cent of the standing timber market.136 In accounting for the subsidizing effect of 
“captive transactions,”137 the AB in Carbon Steel (India) approved the U.S. meth-
odology which calculated the benefit of paying lower royalties.138 How, exactly, to 
calculate a proxy market price for coal is subject to debate, but several experts have 
done so.139 A 2012 study, for example, found that without government subsidiza-
tion, the market price of PRB coal is $33 per short ton.140 
C.  Specificity of the Subsidy 
All actionable subsidies must be specific to certain enterprises under Article 2 
of the SCM Agreement.141 In prior resource extraction disputes, investigating gov-
ernments successfully argued that extraction rights were de facto specific under 
Article 2.1(c).142 Under 2.1(c), specificity is a fact-dependent inquiry which consid-
ers the “use of a subsidy by a limited number of enterprises, predominant use by 
certain enterprises,” and the granting authority’s use of discretion.143 
 
 133. Id. at 16-17. 
 134. Id. at 17. 
 135. Lipton & Meier, supra note 13. 
 136. See Lumber III (Panel), supra note 63, ¶ 7.54. 
 137. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 138. See Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶¶ 4.331-4.335. 
 139. See, e.g., TOM SANZILLO, THE GREAT GIVEAWAY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED 
STATES’ LONG-TERM TREND OF SELLING FEDERALLY-OWNED COAL FOR LESS THAN FAIR 
MARKET VALUE 29-33 (Inst. for Energy Econ. & Fin. Analysis 2012), http://ieefa.org/study-almost-
30-billion-in-revenues-lost-to-taxpayers-by-giveaway-of-federally-owned-coal-in-powder-river-basin/. 
But see ROBERT H. NELSON, THE USE AND MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL COAL 42-45 (Prop. & Env’t 
Res. Ctr. 2017), https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/The-Use-Management-of-Federal-
Coal.pdf (criticizing attempts to calculate the magnitude of the coal leasing program subsidy). 
 140. SANZILLO, supra note 139, at 30. But actual prices in 2012 were roughly a third that amount. 
Coal Markets Archive, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/coal/markets/includes/
archive2.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
 141. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at arts. 2, 8.1. 
 142. See Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, at 194; Lumber IV (Panel), supra note 113. 
 143. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 2.1(c). 
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In Softwood Lumber IV, the Panel determined that Canada’s stumpage ar-
rangement was specific.144 The Panel emphasized that “the inherent characteristics 
of the good” in question, standing timber, limited its utility to “certain enterprises 
only.”145 A provision of standing timber is inherently specific in a way that direct 
provision of a more fungible good—money, “oil, gas, water, etc.”—would not be.146 
It was irrelevant that end-users of timber produced a variety of final products.147 
Instead, the finding of specificity followed from the fact that “the stumpage pro-
gram[ ] can clearly only benefit certain enterprises . . . which can harvest . . . 
standing timber.”148 Canada did not press the issue on appeal.149 
The AB similarly concluded that India’s provision of mining rights was a ben-
efit specific to the steel industry.150 It upheld the U.S. determination that the pro-
gram was actually used by “a limited number” of enterprises.151 This accorded with 
the AB’s view that Article 2.1(c) “suggests an inquiry into whether the enterprises 
or industries so particularized constitute a quantitatively limited group.”152 Echo-
ing Softwood Lumber IV, the AB also determined that the inherent characteristics of 
iron and coal reserves limited the subsidy to a specific industry.153 Though not 
“every provision of goods with limitations inherent in the characteristics of the 
goods will” be specific, such limitations do create a “greater likelihood of a finding 
of specificity.”154 
Commentators have identified specificity as one of the foremost obstacles to 
concluding that fossil fuel subsidies are actionable.155 But these specificity concerns 
are most prominent in cases of consumer-side subsidies that lower the domestic 
price of fossil fuels without disturbing the price of a country’s energy exports.156 
Such consumer-side subsidies tend to benefit large swaths of an economy—from 
shipping companies to large heavy manufacturers to individual homeowners—and 
so arguably fall short of singling out any individual industry in the way that Article 
2 of the SCM Agreement forbids.157 
 
 144. See Lumber IV (Panel), supra note 113, ¶ 7.125. 
 145. Lumber IV (Panel), supra note 113, ¶ 7.116. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. ¶¶ 7.120-7.121 (“[S]pecificity . . . is to be determined at the enterprise or industry level, 
not at the product level.”). 
 148. Id. ¶ 7.121. 
 149. Lumber IV (AB), supra note 59, ¶¶ 5, 45. 
 150. See Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶ 4.398. 
 151. Id. ¶¶ 4.377, 4.380. 
 152. Id. ¶ 4.377. 
 153. Id. ¶ 4.398. 
 154. Id. ¶ 4.393. 
 155. Asmelash, supra note 10, at 281 (“In the context of fossil fuel subsidies, perhaps the most 
difficult challenge comes in the form of meeting the specificity requirement.”). 
 156. See Shadikhodjaev, supra note 11, at 483. 
 157. Id. 
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Unlike such economy-wide price distortions, the BLM’s leasing subsidy is 
specific to the coal extraction industry.158 Though consumers of coal may enjoy 
downstream pricing benefits, the actual use of the program is limited to a small 
number of extractive enterprises.159 Few companies bid for leases and all that do 
are located within the coal extraction industry.160 Further, as in Carbon Steel (In-
dia), the inherent characteristics of coal limit its utility to only those enterprises 
able to harvest and process it.161 Additionally, it could be argued that the leasing 
program is a specific subsidy under Article 2.2 because it is almost entirely “located 
within a designated geographical region,” the PRB.162 A focus on producers of fos-
sil fuels may be more likely to produce a positive specificity finding than a more 
traditional focus on consumers of energy.163 
The prior three sections demonstrate that the BLM’s coal leasing program is 
an actionable subsidy under the SCM Agreement. In order to seek a remedy, how-
ever, a WTO member must further demonstrate that the subsidy has caused it 
some adverse effect. 
III.  ADVERSE EFFECTS AND OPTIONS FOR OTHER WTO MEMBERS 
Article 5 of the SCM Agreement lists three categories of adverse effects: “(a) 
injury to the domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullification or impair-
 
 158. Government-granted rights to extract oil and natural gas could similarly be specific. For 
example, the GAO has found that the Department of Interior’s leasing program for onshore and off-
shore oil and gas leases similarly fails to set adequate royalty rates or calculate an accurate fair market 
value for the underlying resources. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-531, OFFSHORE 
OIL AND GAS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO BETTER ENSURE A FAIR RETURN ON FEDERAL 
RESOURCES 1 (2019). Because of these undervaluations, oil and gas extracted from federal lands is pro-
duced at an artificially low price in comparison to both state and foreign governments. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-676R, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES: A COMPARISON OF THE 
SHARE OF REVENUE RECEIVED FROM OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
AND OTHER RESOURCE OWNERS (2007). 
 159. See Wold et al., supra note 11, at 656 (“Other programs, even if not expressly limited to a 
particular industry, are in fact only available to the fossil fuel industry and thus would likely constitute 
de facto specificity.”). 
 160. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 161. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 17 (observing that few compa-
nies have “the significant capital investment and time required to” make use of new federal leases). 
 162. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 2.2; see also Carbon Steel (AB), supra note 60, ¶ 4.375 
n.1011 (“[U]nder Article 2.2, a positive determination of specificity also hinges on whether a subsidy is 
limited to certain enterprises. In that context, those enterprises must be located within a designated geo-
graphical region.”). 
 163. As U.S. countervailing duty jurisprudence demonstrates, it can be difficult to determine at 
what point disproportionate consumption of energy by an energy-intensive industry crosses the line 
into supporting a finding that an energy policy is an actionable subsidy. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 25 Ct. Int’l Trade 307, 322-23 (2001) (concluding that a Korean electricity subsidy was 
not specific to the steel industry because large electricity consumption was an “inherent characteristic” 
of the steel industry). 
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ment of benefits accruing . . . to other Members . . . ; [and] (c) serious prejudice to 
the interests of another Member.”164 Part III focuses on the first and last of these, 
injury to a domestic industry and serious prejudice to interests. A Member sustain-
ing adverse effects has a choice of remedies; it may either challenge the subsidy in 
the DSU under SCM Article 7165 or it may impose countervailing duties on im-
ports of the subsidized good under GATT Article VI.166 
The adverse effect identification requirement is comparable to the “injury-in-
fact” standing requirement in U.S. federal courts.167 In both systems, injury func-
tions as a “threshold question in every . . . case.”168 Challenging the federal coal 
leasing program not only requires identifying a specific financial contribution be-
ing conferred, but also a WTO member country adversely affected—that is, in-
jured—by that contribution. 
The difficulty of identifying adverse effects is another commonly-raised ob-
stacle to concluding that fossil fuel subsidies are actionable.169 But unlike other fos-
sil fuel subsidies, the existence of coal exports makes it easier to identify WTO 
member countries whose domestic coal industries have been adversely affected by 
the program. Specifically, two classes of countries potentially suffer an adverse ef-
fect sufficient to respond to the BLM’s program; coal exporters could bring a chal-
lenge through the DSU,170 while importers of U.S. coal could impose countervail-
ing duties. 
A.  Challenge Through the DSU 
A WTO member that exports coal to the same market as the United States 
could challenge BLM’s program under SCM Article 7 if it demonstrates that it has 
experienced serious prejudice as a result.171 Australia is well-positioned to make 
such an argument. 
 
 164. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 5. 
 165. Id. art. 7. 
 166. GATT, supra note 45, at art. VI:3. 
 167. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Like standing doctrine in U.S. 
courts, the requirement of individualized injury has the benefit of sharpening legal questions and ensur-
ing that consequential matters are litigated by enthusiastic parties. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962). 
 168. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 169. See Asmelash, supra note 10, at 282 (concluding that it would be “extremely difficult for a 
complainant to demonstrate the existence of adverse effects on its like energy-intensive industry.”). 
 170. “Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, and the WTO’s 
unique contribution to the stability of the global economy.” Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2019). 
 171. See Wold et al., supra note 11, at 659. 
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The largest supplier of coal to East Asia is Australia.172 Australia’s coal mining 
industry has struggled in recent years and could experience significant injury if its 
exports decline.173 At the same time, U.S. coal exports increasingly service con-
sumer markets in East Asia.174 A significant portion of these exports originate from 
BLM coal leases in the PRB.175 Additionally, artificially low U.S. coal prices make 
exports from other U.S. coal deposits more attractive for export.176 Increased U.S. 
coal exports to Asia could cause significant adverse effects to Australia’s domestic 
coal industry if they result in reduced Australian market share.177 Some observers 
speculate that such a trade-off in exports has already begun.178 
Australia has at least a prima facie case for serious prejudice to its interests. 
Article 6.3 provides four different types of prejudice, two of which are most rele-
vant to Australia: “(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of 
a like product of another Member from a third country market;” and “(c) the ef-
fect . . . is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product . . . or price de-
pression or lost sales.”179 To demonstrate displacement, Australia would point to 
changes in its own market share relative to that of the United States.180 Proving 
price undercutting rests on a comparison of the subsidized and non-subsidized like 
 
 172. See Rob Smith, These Are the World’s Biggest Coal Producers, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/these-are-the-worlds-biggest-coal-producers/. 
 173. See Frank Jotzo & Salim Mazouz, Coal Does not Have an Economic Future in Australia, 
CONVERSATION (Sept. 5, 2018), http://theconversation.com/coal-does-not-have-an-economic-future-
in-australia-102718; Ben Deacon, Coal Industry Grapples with Change and the Challenges of Transition, ABC 
NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-04-14/coal-industry-in-transition/9644812. 
 174. See U.S. Coal Exports Increased by 61% in 2017 as Exports to Asia More than Doubled, supra note 
73; Jude Clemente, The U.S. Coal Export Boom to Asia, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/judeclemente/2018/10/07/the-u-s-coal-export-boom-to-china/#439a507e3454. 
 175. See Heather Richards, Hope for Coal Exports Grows in Unstable Market, but Challenges Remain 
Firm, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Apr. 29, 2018), https://trib.com/business/energy/hope-for-coal-exports-
grows-in-unstable-market-but-challenges/article_e3bc2e43-bee2-5896-935e-0722dd139920.html; see also 
Braasch, supra note 39. 
 176. See Williams-Derry, supra note 20, at 1-2. 
 177. See U.S. Coal Exports Increased by 61% in 2017 as Exports to Asia More than Doubled, supra note 
73; see also Keith Johnson, Trump Makes American Coal Great Again—Overseas, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 4, 
2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/04/trump-makes-american-coal-great-again-overseas/. 
 178. See Peter Ker, US Coal Miners Target Australia’s Asian Customers, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Aug. 8, 
2018), https://www.afr.com/business/mining/us-coal-miners-target-australias-asian-customers-
20180808-h13p4o (“American competitors are successfully growing their market share in the Asian 
markets that Australia has traditionally dominated.”). 
 179. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 6.3 (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. art. 6.4. 
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product prices in the same destination market.181 Satisfying any of these conditions 
is sufficient to demonstrate serious prejudice.182 
Brazil’s successful complaint in Upland Cotton is instructive. There, Brazil al-
leged that U.S. subsidies lowered U.S. cotton export prices and displaced Brazilian 
cotton exports in both the “world market” and dozens of specific third country 
markets in which U.S. and Brazilian cotton competed.183 The AB affirmed the 
lower panel’s decision, finding that whether the “market” of competition was de-
fined as the entire world or instead as discrete third markets, the U.S. subsidy had 
caused serious prejudice to Brazilian interests in terms of export displacement.184 
Australia’s challenge to federal coal exports could follow a similar, successful for-
mat. 
B.  Countervailing Duties 
An importer of subsidized U.S. coal could challenge the BLM’s program 
through the DSU citing injury to a domestic industry. But an importer has the ad-
ditional option of imposing countervailing duties on subsidized imports under 
GATT Article VI.185 Imposition of duties has several advantages over a challenge 
through the DSU. Duties avoid the costly, years-long disputes that play out in the 
DSU.186 They also offer a more certain form of retaliation given the difficulties of 
enforcing WTO judgments.187 Though a number of countries are potentially posi-
tioned to impose countervailing duties, China is the best situated. 
 
 181. Id. art. 6.5. 
 182. See Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 7.1390, WTO Doc. WT/
DS267/R (adopted Sept. 8, 2004). Proving “serious prejudice” may entail a lower evidentiary burden 
than proving “injury.” Wold et al., supra note 11, at 693. 
 183. Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶ 400, WTO Doc. WT/
DS267/AB/R (adopted Mar. 3, 2005). 
 184. Id. ¶¶ 414, 456, 496. After the AB authorized Brazil to retaliate against the United States, 
the two countries instead agreed to monthly financial payments to compensate Brazilian cotton farmers 
for their losses. Vicki Needham, US, Brazil Settle Cotton Dispute, HILL (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/219434-us-brazil-settle-cotton-dispute. After years of these pay-
ments, the two countries then agreed to a final lump-sum settlement that left the U.S. cotton subsidies 
in place. Id. 
 185. GATT, supra note 45, at art. VI. 
 186. See Asmelash, supra note 10, at 279 (“The average cost of initiating a WTO dispute is esti-
mated to be around US$1 million per year for the duration of the dispute, depending on its complexi-
ty.”); Gregory Shaffer et al., The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 267-70 (2016) (observing that Appellate Body proceedings in particular are 
long, complex, and vulnerable to delay tactics). 
 187. See Won-Mog Choi, To Comply or Not to Comply?—Non-implementation Problems in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 1043, 1043 (2007) (cataloguing difficulties of enforcing 
DSU decisions); Chad P. Bown, Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why 
Are So Few Challenged?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 515 (2005) (concluding that relatively few trade remedy 
actions are actually challenged in the DSU). 
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China is the world’s largest coal producer as well as one of the largest import-
ers of coal.188 Though its consumption is expected to peak as the country transi-
tions to greener forms of energy generation,189 China remains a major consumer of 
American coal.190 As China tries to reduce its demand for imported coal, Chinese 
producers risk being undercut by lower-priced imported coal.191 The “squeeze of 
imported coal” could lower domestic Chinese coal production and reduce the in-
dustry’s employment.192 
Article 15 lists the factors that China would need to cite to prove an injury to 
its domestic coal industry.193 It would need to identify: (1) the volume of subsi-
dized coal; (2) the price effects of the imported coal;194 and (3) the impact on Chi-
na’s coal industry, including “decline in output, sales, market share, profits, 
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity” as well as factors 
like “inventory, employment, [and] wages.”195 A successful challenge would also 
define the relevant “like product” and “domestic industry,” which are unlikely to 
hamper China’s effort.196 Article 15.7 also allows China to argue that it faces an 
imminent threat of material injury, dependent on an additional list of factors.197 
In the past, China’s need for coal likely overwhelmed any desire to tax coal 
imports.198 And China’s reliance on coal today may still prevent the country from 
 
 188. See These Are the World’s Biggest Coal Producers, supra note 172. 
 189. See Qi Ye & Jiaqi Lu, China’s Coal Consumption Has Peaked, BROOKINGS (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/2018/01/22/chinas-coal-consumption-has-peaked/; see also Melanie Hart et 
al., Everything You Think You Know About Coal in China Is Wrong, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 15, 
2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2017/05/15/432141/everything-think-
know-coal-china-wrong/. 
 190. See Clyde Russell, U.S. Coal Exports Surge, but Thank China, not Trump, REUTERS (July 31, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-russell-coal-usa/u-s-coal-exports-surge-but-thank-
china-not-trump-russell-idUSKBN1AG0CC. 
 191. See Yunna Wu et al., Competitiveness Analysis of Coal Industry in China: A Diamond Model 
Study, 52 RESOURCES POL’Y 39, 41 (2017). 
 192. Id. at 52. 
 193. SCM Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 15. 
 194. Id. arts. 15.1-15.2. 
 195. Id. art. 15.4. 
 196. Id. arts. 15.1, 16. Other scholars have concluded that “products used to generate renewable 
energy such as solar panels and wind turbines are not ‘like’ fossil fuels under the SCM Agreement.” 
Wold et al., supra note 11, at 684. This issue is avoided, however, by identifying foreign-produced coal 
as the “like product” in question. 
 197. SCM Agreement art. 15.7, supra note 7 (considering the nature of the subsidy, the increasing 
rate of subsidized imports, the increasing capacity of exporters to increase production, whether subsi-
dized imports depress domestic prices, and the volume of inventories of the subsidized good). 
 198. See Kevin Tu & Sabine Johnson-Reiser, Understanding China’s Rising Coal Imports, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Feb. 16, 2012), https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/
16/understanding-china-s-rising-coal-imports-pub-47215 (“Over the past decade, China’s domestic coal 
output has more than doubled while its coal imports have increased by a factor of 60—the country’s 
dependence on other nations’ coal exports is growing.”). 
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taking actions that would raise the price of imported coal.199 But China’s current 
national interests might also align to restrict coal imported from the United 
States.200 The Chinese government now seeks to transition to renewable energy,201 
bolster domestic coal production,202 and retaliate against U.S. tariffs imposed by 
the Trump Administration.203 Imposing countervailing duties would further all 
three of these objectives. As a result, China has the necessary legal conditions and 
could have the motive necessary to actually impose countervailing duties on U.S. 
coal imports. 
C.  The Virtues and Limits of Enforcement Under the SCM Agreement 
Despite attention on the issue, efforts to reform fossil fuel subsidies from 
within countries have achieved only minor, sporadic successes.204 As others have 
argued, the lack of meaningful progress is largely attributable to the influence of 
well-resourced and politically-connected fossil fuel companies.205 These same com-
panies are likely to oppose reform pressures that arise out of challenges brought 
through the WTO. Like any other government action, companies that would be 
harmed by a particular WTO dispute invest lobbying resources to influence their 
 
 199. See Mengjia Ren et al., China Overinvested in Coal Power: Here’s Why, VOX (Mar. 16, 2019), 
https://voxeu.org/article/china-overinvested-coal-power-here-s-why. 
 200. Domestic interests play an essential role in WTO dispute initiation and litigation. Jappe 
Eckhardt & Dirk De Bièvre, Boomerangs over Lac Léman: Transnational Lobbying and Foreign Venue Shop-
ping in WTO Dispute Settlement, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 507, 508 (2015). The role of domestic interests 
is even greater in determining the imposition of domestic trade remedies because the relevant industries 
must petition for a government investigation and lobby for countervailing duties. See SCM Agreement, 
supra note 7, art. 11.1 (“[A]n investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged 
subsidy shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry.”); see also 
Asmelash, supra note 10, at 282 (“The key question is . . . whether the domestic industries have an in-
centive to lobby their governments to take action against foreign subsidies.”). 
 201. See Hart et al., supra note 189; see also Ye & Lu, supra note 189. 
 202. See Clyde Russell, China Move to Restrict Coal Imports May Drive Price Divergence, REUTERS 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-russell/china-move-to-restrict-coal-imports-
may-drive-price-divergence-russell-idUSKBN1HO1JV. Of course, China may be wary of challenging 
U.S. fossil fuel subsidies, knowing that the same arguments could be levied against China. Cf. Asme-
lash, supra note 10, at 284 (“Countries may therefore be unwilling to challenge each other out of fear 
that their own subsidy may come under scrutiny.”). 
 203. See Joe Ryan & Zhe Huang, China’s Taxing America’s Coal Just as It Was Looking to Buy More, 
BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/china-s-taxing-
america-s-coal-just-as-it-was-looking-to-buy-more. 
 204. Laura Merrill & Nina Quintas, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Fossil Fuel Subsidies and 
Reform on the Rise, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (May 29, 2019), https://www.iisd.org/gsi/
subsidy-watch-blog/fossil-fuel-subsidies-and-reform-on-the-rise. 
 205. See, e.g., Shadikhodjaev, supra note 11, at 483. 
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government’s response to the dispute.206 This suggests a certain degree of humility 
about the potential for broad reform of subsidies under the SCM Agreement. 
At the same time, action under the SCM Agreement has the potential to shift 
the political calculus that has kept fossil fuel subsidies in place. First, WTO-
sanctioned retaliation is designed to harm other powerful industries in the target 
country that will then lobby their government to repeal the trade-distorting policy 
at issue.207 Second, imposing duties on U.S. coal exports would lower the volume 
and profitability of those sales abroad, reducing the financial surplus that benefi-
ciaries of the subsidy may devote to lobbying efforts. Together, retaliation could 
sufficiently shift the balance of financial and political incentives that the United 
States faces and simply make the costs of retaining the current coal leasing pro-
gram too great.208 
If reform is successful, it could prevent significant additional global emissions. 
Although some reduction in U.S. production would admittedly be offset by Chi-
nese and Australian coal, that offset would not defeat the purpose of the reform. 
First, countries like China and India import U.S. coal because it undercuts alterna-
tive supplies.209 By some estimates, the increased consumption enabled by U.S. 
imports will raise Chinese emissions alone by the equivalent of 35 million passen-
ger cars.210 Second, U.S. coal exports undercut the ability of the United States to 
credibly signal to other countries its commitment to reducing global emissions.211 
Finally, the availability of cheap PRB coal has increased pressure to expand coal 
 
 206. See Jeheung Ryu & Randall W. Stone, Plaintiffs by Proxy: A Firm-Level Approach to WTO 
Dispute Resolution, 13 REV. INT’L ORGS. 273, 304-05 (2018). 
 207. See Mark L. Movsesian, Essay, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (“By imposing burdens on the products of countries that adopt such 
measures, the retaliation remedy creates incentives for another set of domestic interest groups—
exporters—to lobby against them. Over time, if retaliation is correctly calibrated, the domestic groups 
that favor free trade can neutralize the effect of the domestic groups that oppose it.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 208. Id. at 21 (“Retaliation accomplishes this task by promoting trade indirectly, creating incen-
tives for domestic groups to lobby against protectionist measures while allowing national governments 
the ultimate say on regulatory policy.”). But it is also possible that reduced respect for international 
institutions—the WTO chief among them—could short-circuit this traditional mechanism of political 
reform through WTO disputes. See Gregory Shaffer, How Do We Get Along? International Economic Law 
and the Nation-State, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1244 & n.78 (2019). 
 209. See Russell, supra note 190. 
 210. Nathan Joo et al., Fact Sheet: 5 Things You Should Know About Powder River Basin Coal Ex-
ports, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/
reports/2014/08/19/95820/fact-sheet-5-things-you-should-know-about-powder-river-basin-coal-exports/. 
 211. Joby Warrick, U.S. Exports Its Greenhouse-Gas Emissions—As Coal. Profitable Coal., WASH. 
POST (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-exports-its-greenhouse-gas-
emissions—as-coal-profitable-coal/2015/10/08/05711c92-65fc-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html (re-
ferring, naturally, to the Obama Administration’s efforts to organize an international response to cli-
mate change, an effort that has come to a halt under the Trump Administration). 
_JCI_EREPENBACH.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2020  1:23 PM 
Spring 2020] The Federal Coal Leasing Program 529 
 
infrastructure, both in the American west and abroad.212 If industries continue to 
invest so much in fossil-fuel specific infrastructure that will become outdated over 
time, they will contribute to “carbon lock-in” that frustrates future clean energy 
transitions.213 Though reform of the BLM’s program is not sufficient to reverse 
global trends, it is nevertheless one piece of the larger effort necessary to mitigate 
the worst effects of climate change. 
CONCLUSION 
The BLM’s coal leasing program satisfies the SCM Agreement’s definition of 
an actionable subsidy. It should be noted, however, that the precise process of in-
vestigation prescribed by the SCM Agreement is highly technical. The conclusions 
reached here, particularly on questions of benefit and adverse effects, are necessari-
ly dependent on a deeper quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, at least two conclu-
sions emerge from the above analysis. First, the SCM Agreement, like much of the 
WTO, rests on a proper alignment of state interests. The United States will face 
consequences for its subsidizing behavior only if Australia or China determines 
that it is in its national interest to make a challenge. Second, the BLM’s program 
demonstrates that the SCM Agreement can be an asset—rather than merely a lia-
bility—to climate policy. Responses to climate change should, whenever possible, 
cohere with traditional, even short-term national interests. Toward that end, the 
SCM Agreement offers an opportunity to significantly reduce U.S. coal-based 
emissions by enlisting economic self-interest to enforce established law. 
 
 
 212. Lappen, supra note 27, at 184-85 (“In recent years, leading American coal companies have 
restructured to vertically integrate mines with export facilities, signed long-term export agreements, and 
sought supply contracts with Asian utilities.”). 
 213. Cf. Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. 
REV. 645, 646-47 (2017). 
